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Lippert-Rasmussen (2020) argues that the moral equality account of the hypocrite’s lack of 
standing to blame fails. To object to this account, Lippert-Rasmussen considers the contrary of 
hypocrisy: hypercrisy. In this article, I show that if hypercrisy is a problem for the moral equality 
account, it is also a problem for Lippert-Rasmussen’s own account of why hypocrites lack standing 
to blame. I then reflect on the hypocrite’s and hypercrite’s standing to self-blame, which reveals that 
the challenge hypercrisy poses for accounts of standing is different than the challenge Lippert-
Rasmussen articulates. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
When we make an exception of ourselves, we often become the target of moral criticism. Putting 
our interests ahead of others’ is labelled as selfish, demanding special treatment is considered 
entitled and blaming people for wrongs that we are unrepentantly guilty of is thought to be 
hypocritical. But whether, and why, these attitudes and behaviours are wrong is the topic of debate. 
Take, for example, discussions surrounding hypocrisy and standing to blame. Many argue that 
hypocrites lack standing to blame. Because these agents engage in unapologetic wrongdoing, they 
do not possess the moral authority to make demands of others who perform relevantly similar 
wrongs by blaming them.1 However, there is very little agreement about why this is the case.2 
 According to one account, which Lippert-Rasmussen calls the moral equality account (ME), 
hypocrites lack standing to blame because hypocritical blame ‘…(implicitly) denies moral equality 
of persons’ (2020: 2). On this view, blaming others for behaviour that you have performed but for 
which you do not blame yourself constitutes treating people unequally for no good reason. And 
treating people unequally for no good reason is incompatible with moral equality of persons. So, 
hypocritical blame denies moral equality of persons, and this is why hypocrites lack standing to 
blame. 
 
1 I follow Lippert-Rasmussen in focusing on public, dialogical blame and conceiving of standing in terms of the moral 
authority to make demands of others to respond to one’s blame (2020: 1–2). However, see Piovarchy (forthcoming) 
for a discussion of the different uses of standing in the literature. 
2 For competing accounts, see Cohen 2013, Fritz & Miller 2018, 2019a, 2019b, Isserow & Klein 2017, Piovarchy 
forthcoming, Rossi 2018, 2020, Scanlon 2008, Todd 2019 and Wallace 2010. And, for criticism of the claim that 
hypocrites lack standing, see Bell 2013 and King 2019.  
 
 ME has several defenders in the literature (Wallace 2010; Fritz & Miller 2018) and nicely 
captures why it is objectionable to make an exception of yourself by engaging in hypocritical blame. 
Nevertheless, Lippert-Rasmussen argues that this account fails. One of his critiques focuses on 
the contrary of hypocrisy: hypercrisy.3 Hypercrisy occurs when agents severely blame themselves 
for minor wrongs while either ignoring or only mildly blaming others for more significant wrongs 
(Lippert-Rasmussen 2020: 2–3). Lippert-Rasmussen argues that hypercrites are relevantly similar 
to hypocrites—either both treat people unequally for no good reason and thus (at least implicitly) 
deny moral equality of persons or neither does. But the hypercrite, unlike the hypocrite, does not 
lack standing to blame. Surely no one could object to being blamed by a hypercrite on the grounds 
that she blames herself for lesser wrongs to a significantly greater degree. And if the hypercrite 
does not lose standing to blame, yet she is relevantly similar to the hypocrite with regards to the 
denial of equality of persons, then ME must be false. It cannot be the case that denying moral 
equality of persons explains why the hypocrite lacks standing to blame.   
 Lippert-Rasmussen concludes his article by proposing a competing account of why 
hypocrisy undermines standing to blame, which I call the taking norms seriously account (TNS). He 
argues that because hypocrites do not blame themselves for violating moral norms, they are not 
concerned about their violations or serious about the norms themselves. And one does not have 
the moral authority to enforce norms that one is not serious about. So, the hypocrite lacks standing 
to blame, not because he denies equality of persons, but because he is not serious about the norms 
that he blames others for violating.   
 Lippert-Rasmussen’s reflections on the nature of hypercrisy are illuminating and can serve 
to push discussions of standing forward considerably. However, I argue that considerations of 
hypercrisy do not drive the debate in the direction that Lippert-Rasmussen wishes to pursue. In 
 
3 Lippert-Rasmussen also objects to the closely related anti-moral superiority account. His criticism of this view focuses 
on cases of hypocritically and non-hypocritically blaming others for violating inegalitarian norms. Because my aim in 
this article is to explore what hypercrisy and self-blame can tell us about standing, I will focus only on his challenge 
to ME.  
 
§2, I show that if hypercrisy is a problem for ME, it is also a problem for TNS: Just as hypercrites 
are relevantly similar to hypocrites in denying equality of persons, they are also relevantly similar 
in failing to take norms seriously. In §3, I argue that the challenge hypercrisy poses for accounts 
of standing is different than the challenge Lippert-Rasmussen articulates. While hypocrites lack 
standing to blame others, they maintain standing to blame themselves. In contrast, hypercrites lack 
standing to blame themselves, but possess standing to blame others. Thus, the challenge for accounts 
of standing is not to explain why hypocrites lack standing and hypercrites possess it. Rather, the 
challenge is to explain why hypocrites lack standing to blame others but possess standing to self-
blame, while hypercrites maintain standing to blame others but not themselves. I conclude in §4 
by briefly reflecting on the importance of attending to self-blame when theorising about standing 
and the ethics of blame more generally.   
2. Hypercrisy and Taking Norms Seriously 
Here is Lippert-Rasmussen’s statement of ME:  
What deprives the hypocrite of her standing to blame others is the fact that, in virtue of 
her hypocritical blame, she (implicitly) denies moral equality of persons. (2020: 2) 
And here are the key claims of Lippert-Rasmussen’s argument against this view:  
 
(Relevantly Similar Equality Claim) Hypocrites and hypercrites are relevantly similar with 
regards to the denial of moral equality of persons.    
 
(Standing Asymmetry Claim) Hypocrites lack standing to blame but hypercrites do not 
lack standing to blame.   
 
(Anti-Equality Conclusion) So, what explains hypocrites’ lack of standing cannot be their 
denial of moral equality of persons.   
 
The ME theorist may be tempted to object to the Relevantly Similar Equality Claim. One could 
argue that the relationships we bear with ourselves licence a higher degree of blame than the 
relationships we bear with other people, such that hypercrites rarely engage in blame that treats 
people unequally for no good reason and denies equality of persons.4 But Lippert-Rasmussen 
 
4 For an extended discussion of a similar claim, see Nelkin (forthcoming).   
 
could grant that we are generally permitted to blame ourselves to greater degrees than others while 
still claiming that there is at least one instance of hypercrisy that is relevantly similar to hypocrisy, 
where either both the hypercrite and hypocrite deny equality of persons or neither does. And as 
long as the hypocrite lacks standing to blame while the hypercrite possesses it, then the argument 
goes through.  
 After rejecting ME, Lippert-Rasmussen proposes an alternative explanation for why 
hypocrites lack standing to blame, TNS:  
All of the hypocrites that we have encountered have one common feature: they are not really 
serious about the norm which they blame others for not complying with. Their lack of 
seriousness manifests itself in their being relatively unconcerned about their own violations 
of the norm. Thus…lack of seriousness about a norm undermines one’s standing as a critic 
of others’ non-compliance with that norm. (2020: 7)  
 
While Lippert-Rasmussen concedes that this account requires further defence in light of cases he 
does not discuss (2020: 7), one of the cases he considers—hypercrisy—also poses a challenge to 
the view. Perhaps Lippert-Rasmussen is right that hypocrites lack the requisite seriousness for 
standing to blame. But if hypocrites are unserious about the norms they blame others for violating, 
then hypercrites also fail to be serious about the norms that they blame themselves for violating. 
According to Lippert-Rasmussen, because the hypocrite does not blame himself for violating a 
norm, he is not concerned with his own violations of the norm or serious about the norm itself. 
Similarly, one could argue that because the hypercrite does not blame others for violating a norm, 
she is not concerned about their violations of the norm or serious about the norm itself. Just as 
we can blame others for violating norms that we do not care about, we can also blame ourselves 
without caring about the relevant norms. Imagine an agent who severely blames himself for telling 
even the smallest white lie, while rarely and only mildly disapproving of others who engage in more 
harmful deceits. The agent engages in this hypercritical blame not because he cares about honesty, 
but because he struggles with feelings of self-loathing and takes every opportunity to engage in 
self-punishing behaviour. In this case, the agent’s severe self-blame is clearly about something 
other than the norm in question.  
 
 But if hypocrites and hypercrites are relevantly similar with regards to not taking norms 
seriously, then one can object to TNS in the very same way Lippert-Rasmussen objects to ME: 
(Relevantly Similar Seriousness Claim) Hypocrites and hypercrites are relevantly similar 
with regards to not taking norms seriously.    
 
(Standing Asymmetry Claim) Hypocrites lack standing to blame but hypercrites do not 
lack standing to blame.   
 
(Anti-Seriousness Conclusion) So, what explains hypocrites’ lack of standing cannot be 
that they do not take norms seriously.   
 
The TNS theorist may be tempted to deny the Relevantly Similar Seriousness Claim. One could 
argue that because self-blame is generally more costly to oneself than other-directed blame, self-
blame about a norm violation manifests a higher degree of seriousness about that norm than other-
directed blame for similar violations. This may very well be true. However, all one needs to secure 
the Relevantly Similar Seriousness Claim is one instance in which a hypercrite’s asymmetrical 
blaming behaviour is relevantly similar to hypocrites’ asymmetrical blaming behaviour with regards 
to taking norms seriously. Because individuals can engage in self-blame for reasons other than 
taking norms seriously (e.g. because they are masochistic, have an inferiority complex or want to 
virtue signal) it will be easy to establish this claim. And, as long as these hypercrites do not lose 
standing to blame, the argument goes through. Thus, hypercrisy poses a symmetrical challenge to 
both ME and TNS: If ME fails, then TNS will fail on the very same grounds.  
3. Standing to Self-Blame 
In the above discussion, I’ve granted the Standing Asymmetry Claim and assumed that hypocrites 
lack standing to blame while hypercrites possess it. However, it will be worthwhile to investigate 
this claim. To illustrate that hypercrites possess standing to blame, Lippert-Rasmussen presents 
the following case:  
Suppose Adrian severely blames himself for, say, stealing $10 from a rich person, while at 
the same time expressing mild disapproval of Beth’s theft of all of the possessions of a poor 
person. Surely Beth cannot dismiss Adrian’s mild disapproval on the ground that, owing to 
his hypercrisy, he has no standing to blame her. (2020: 3) 
 
 
Lippert-Rasmussen may be right that Beth cannot object to being blamed by Adrian in virtue of 
his hypercrisy. Still, there is something objectionable about Adrian’s self-blame, and hypercritical 
self-blame more generally. One could argue that hypercritical self-blame is criticisable because it is 
disproportionate—hypercrites blame themselves too much for minor wrongs. And while this will 
no doubt be true of many hypercrites, this doesn’t fully capture why hypercrisy is criticisable. After 
all, it’s possible that a hypercrite blames herself to the appropriate degree and blames others too 
little. But even in this case, there is something unfair about blaming oneself to a significantly and 
arbitrarily greater degree than one blames others. And while it is unlikely that the hypercrite would 
object to this inappropriate self-blame, since she is the culprit as well as the victim, those who care 
about her would likely object on her behalf. It is not uncommon for the loved ones of hypercritical 
individuals to intervene in an attempt to stop their asymmetrically harsh self-treatment, often by 
asking: ‘Would you treat another person this way?’   
 One could argue that individuals cannot blame themselves unfairly, at least not in the same 
way that their blame of others can be unfair, and so there is nothing unfair about hypercritical self-
blame. But this claim lacks plausibility. Self-blame can be unfair in many of the same ways that 
other-directed blame can be unfair—self-blame, like other-directed blame, can be unfitting, 
disproportionate and unjustified. So, it stands to reason that self-blame can also be unfair in virtue 
of being hypercritical, just as other-directed blame can be unfair in virtue of being hypocritical. 
But in what sense is hypercritical self-blame unfair? Given the above considerations, one 
could argue that hypercritical self-blame is unfair because it lacks standing. According to Lippert-
Rasmussen, when we have standing to blame others, we have the moral authority to demand that 
they uptake our blame by, for example, apologising or making amends (2020: 1–2). Similarly, when 
we have standing to self-blame, we possess the moral authority to demand of ourselves that we 
engage in these same reparative behaviours. And while we generally have greater authority over 
ourselves than others, one could argue that we do not have the moral authority to blame ourselves 
 
hypercritically.5 Interestingly, both ME and TNS can explain why the hypercrite doesn’t have 
standing to self-blame. The hypercrite demands more of herself than she does of others for no 
good reason, which denies equality of persons and, according to ME, undermines her standing to 
self-blame. The hypercrite also attempts to enforce norms that she isn’t serious about, as evidenced 
by her relative lack of concern regarding other agents’ violations. And, according to TNS, agents 
cannot possess the moral authority to enforce norms that they are not serious about. Thus, 
Lippert-Rasmussen’s claim that hypercrites possess standing to blame may be only partially correct. 
By relying on ME and/or TNS, one can argue that hypercrites lack standing to blame themselves. 
Can the fact that hypercrites lack standing to self-blame be used to dismiss the Standing 
Asymmetry Claim? Not quite. While hypercrisy arguably undermines agents’ standing to self-
blame, it doesn’t undermine their standing to blame others, as illustrated by Lippert-Rasmussen’s 
discussion of Adrian above. And, once we begin to attend to standing to self-blame, a new and 
interesting asymmetry between hypocrites and hypercrites is revealed. While the hypocrite does 
not have the moral authority to blame others for violating norms that he has unapologetically 
violated, he doesn’t lose the standing to blame himself for violating these norms. To see this, we 
can alter Lippert-Rasmussen’s case:  
Suppose Adrian severely blames Beth for, say, stealing $10 from a rich person, while at the 
same time expressing only mild disapproval of his own theft of all of the possessions of a 
poor person. Surely Adrian cannot dismiss his mild self-disapproval on the ground that, 
owing to his hypocrisy, he has no standing to blame himself. 
 
In this case, though Beth could dismiss Adrian’s blame on the grounds that it is hypocritical, 
Adrian cannot dismiss his own self-blame on the same grounds. Not only do hypocrites possess 
standing to self-blame, they are often encouraged to blame themselves. Indeed, many argue that 
hypocrites can regain standing to blame others by blaming themselves (Fritz & Miller 2018; 
 
5 One could object that because hypercrites want to blame themselves hypercritically, this gives them the moral 
authority to do so. However, many individuals engage in hypercritical self-blame not because they want to, but out of 
compulsion, self-loathing, etc. But, even for those who do want to be the target of hypercritical self-blame, this does 
not grant them the moral authority to engage in the practice. Imagine an individual who wants to be the target of 
hypocritical blame. This does not give the hypocritical blamer standing—they still lack the moral authority to demand 
that the blamee uptakes their blame, even if the blamee would happily oblige.  
 
Lippert-Rasmussen 2020). Thus, Lippert-Rasmussen’s claim that hypocrites lack standing to blame 
is, like his claim regarding hypercrisy, only partially correct. Though the hypocrite lacks standing 
to blame others, he retains standing to self-blame.  
 If the above discussion is correct, then there are two ways in which the hypocrite’s standing 
to blame differs from the hypercrite’s: while the hypercrite has standing to blame others but not 
herself, the hypocrite possesses standing to blame himself but not others. So, rather than dismiss 
the Standing Asymmetry Claim, we must replace it with two claims that capture the full extent to 
which hypocrites and hypercrites differ in terms of standing:      
(Standing to Blame Others Asymmetry Claim) Hypocrites lack standing to blame others 
but hypercrites do not lack standing to blame others.   
 
(Standing to Self-Blame Asymmetry Claim) Hypocrites do not lack standing to self-
blame but hypercrites lack standing to self-blame.    
 
When paired with the Relevantly Similar Equality Claim and Relevantly Similar Seriousness Claim, 
these asymmetry claims present problems for both ME and TNS. Since both hypocrites and 
hypercrites are relevantly similar with regards to denying moral equality of persons and taking 
norms seriously, neither account can offer an explanation for why hypocrites lack standing to 
blame others but hypercrites do not, nor can they explain why hypocrites possess standing to self-
blame while hypercrites lack it.  
 There are many ways defenders of ME and TNS can object to the above asymmetry claims. 
For instance, they could deny that agents can possess and/or lose standing to self-blame. This 
would require them to explain why self-blame can be evaluated along many of the same dimensions 
that we evaluate other-directed blame—fittingness, proportionality, justification—but not in terms 
of standing. And, even if this hurdle is overcome, both accounts are still vulnerable to Lippert-
Rasmussen’s original asymmetry claim. Alternatively, they could argue that hypercrisy and 
hypocrisy undermine standing to blame others and self-blame. However, this would require these 
theorists to revise their arguments, since Lippert-Rasmussen argues extensively for the claim that 
hypercrites possess standing to blame others and both views are implicitly committed to hypocrites 
 
possessing standing to self-blame (e.g. Fritz & Miller 2018: 133–4; Lippert-Rasmussen 2020: 7). 
Finally, it may be possible to augment these accounts to explain the asymmetries. But until these 
views address the distinction between standing to blame others and standing to self-blame, their 
explanations are bound to be incomplete.  
4. Conclusion  
Though the literature on the ethics of blame, and standing to blame in particular, has expanded in 
recent years, very little attention has been paid to the ethics of self-blame.6 This is an unfortunate 
oversight. In this article, examining hypocritical and hypercritical self-blame illuminated important 
and overlooked weaknesses in extant accounts of hypocrisy and standing to blame. It is likely that 
further reflection on the nature of self-blame can be brought to bear on other debates surrounding 
the ethics of blame as well.7  
  
 
6 For exceptions, see Nelkin (forthcoming) and Tierney (forthcoming).  
7 I am grateful to David Glick, Thomas Tierney and two anonymous referees for their very helpful feedback.  
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